Rutledge was nominated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 21, 1939, to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, to a new Associate Justice seat authorized by 52 Stat. 584. He was confirmed by the United States Senate on April 4, 1939, and received his commission on May 2, 1939. His service terminated on February 14, 1943, due to his elevation to the Supreme Court. Rutledge was nominated by President Roosevelt on January 11, 1943, to the Supreme Court of the United States, to an Associate Justice seat vacated by Associate Justice James F. Byrnes. He was confirmed by the Senate on February 8, 1943, and received his commission on February 11, 1943. He served as Circuit Justice for the Eighth Circuit and Tenth Circuit from March 1, 1943 to September 10, 1949. Rutledge was significantly less conservative than Byrnes and he remained a steady ally of Roosevelt throughout his court career. His service terminated on September 10, 1949, due to his death.
Judicial philosophy
Rutledge articulated strong liberal positions, particularly in his interpretation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He wrote for the court in 1946 in Kotteakos v. United States that "our Government is not one of mere convenience or efficiency. It too has a stake, with every citizen, in his being afforded our historic individual protections, including those surrounding criminal trials. About them we dare not become careless or complacent when that fashion has become rampant over the earth." Rutledge extended this position to dissent from the Court's decision in Yamashita v. Styer, in which Japanese general Tomoyuki Yamashita filed for habeas corpus to appeal his conviction for war crimes in World War II. He wrote: According to Justice Frankfurter, Rutledge was part of the more liberal "axis" of justices on the Court, along with Justices Murphy, Douglas, and Black; the group would for years oppose Frankfurter's ideology of judicial restraint. Douglas, Murphy, and then Rutledge were the first justices to agree with Black's notion that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights protection into it; this view would later become law.
One of Rutledge's law clerks, John Paul Stevens, was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1975. His tenure on the Court influenced Justice Stevens, who had helped Rutledge draft his dissent in Ahrens v. Clark. In 1948, a 6-3 majority of the Supreme Court ruled that unless detained persons are within the physical jurisdiction of the District Court when they petition for a writ of habeas corpus, that court has no jurisdiction to hear the case. Rutledge dissented, arguing that instead of the jurisdiction deriving from the location of the prisoner, it should instead derive from the custodian, the person responsible for the imprisonment. John Paul Stevens later tracked this case and its application to case law. In 1973, the Supreme Court substantially overturned Ahrens, ruling similarly to how Rutledge would have. Justice Rutledge's views were formally endorsed by the Supreme Court in 2004, when Justice John Stevens ruled in Rasul v. Bush that courts were to consider the location of the custodian, rather than the physical location of the prisoner themselves. This ruling allowed detainees in Guantanamo Bay to sue in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus. Another of his law clerks was Louis H. Pollak, who became a federal judge and dean of Yale Law School and the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Death
On August 27, 1949, Rutledge was vacationing in Maine. He had a stroke while driving his car and died two weeks later in York, Maine. His remains are interred at Green Mountain Cemetery in Boulder, Colorado.