Informal studies as early as 1906 covered a number of possibilities, from basing at Gibraltar or Singapore to "a quick trans-Atlantic dash" to the Pacific. The plan eventually adopted was conceived by Rear Admiral Raymond P. Rodgers in 1911.
10 Jan 1929 - Revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange
20 Jun 1934 - Inadequacy of Present Military and Naval Forces Philippine Area to Carry Out Assigned Missions in Event of an ORANGE War
8 May 1935 - Revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Orange
19 May 1935 - Revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Orange
14 Oct 1936 - Revision of Joint Orange Estimate of the Situation
9 Dec 1936 - Changes in Joint Basic War Plan Orange
19 Feb 1938 - Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange
The plan was formally adopted by the Joint Army and Navy Board beginning in 1924. Predating the Rainbow plans, which presumed the assistance of allies, Orange assumed that the United States would fight Japan alone.
Strategy
As originally conceived, it anticipated a blockade of the Philippines and other U.S. outposts in the Western Pacific. They were expected to hold out on their own while the Pacific Fleet marshaled its strength at bases in California, and guarded against attacks on the Panama Canal. After mobilization, the fleet would sail to the Western Pacific to relieve American forces in Guam and the Philippines. Afterwards, the fleet would sail North for a decisive battle against the Imperial Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet and then blockade the Japanese home islands. That was in keeping with the theory ofAlfred Thayer Mahan, a doctrine to which every major navy subscribed before World War II in which wars would be decided by engagements between opposing surface fleets. The strategy followed by the U.S. in the Pacific War differed little from Rodgers' concept from 1911: a "leapfrog" campaign to conquer the Marshalls and Carolines ; liberation of the Philippines; and blockade. Absent was the "decisive battle" of Mahan, and of Japanese planning.
Japanese plans
The Imperial Japanese Navy developed a counter-plan to allow the U.S. Pacific Fleet to sail across the Pacific while using submarines and carrier attacks to weaken it. The Japanese fleet would then attempt to force a fleet action against the weakened U.S. fleet in a "decisive battle area", near Japan, also in line with Mahanian doctrine, which Japan had enthusiastically embraced. It was the basis for Japan's demand for a 70% ratio at the Washington Naval Conference, which was considered necessary to provide Japan superiority in the "decisive battle area", as well as the United States' insistence on 60%, which amounted to parity.
Outcomes
Actual events generally followed the plan. Although carrier battles and the use of airplanes and submarines overshadowed surface action, the "leapfrog" campaign played out largely as anticipated. The ImperialJapanese Navy, obsessed with the "decisive battle" doctrine, ignored the vital need for defense against submarines. The German and American submarine campaigns against their opponents' merchant shipping demonstrated the need for anti-submarine warfare. While the Allies took extensive measures to combat the threat of German U-boats, the Japanese failed to effectively counter the American submarines which ultimately choked Japan's industrial production and paralyzed her navy. Japan also notably failed to institute an anti-commerce campaign herself; systematic use of commerce raiders could have made Allied operations much more complex and conquering and holding Japanese-held islands more difficult. American war planners failed to appreciate that technological advances in submarines and naval aviation had made Mahan's doctrine obsolete and did not anticipate a pre-emptive strike from the Japanese. In particular, they did not yet know either that aircraft would be able to effectively sink battleships or that Japan might put the American battleship force out of action at a stroke, which actually happened at Pearl Harbor. American plans changed after this attack. Even after major Japanese defeats like Midway, once the effectiveness of aircraft carriers was known, the Americans favored a methodical "island-hopping" advance, never going far beyond land-based air cover. Meanwhile, a blockade was imposed from the very beginning of the war, with the first American submarine, USS Gudgeon, arriving off Japan on about 31 December 1941. A number of requirements grew out of Orange, including the specification for a fleet submarine with high speed, long range, and heavy torpedo armament. These coalesced in the submarine Dolphin in 1932. The demand for submarines of this size also drove the development of the notoriously problematical Mark 14 torpedo, under the guidance of Commander Ralph W. Christie. The Navy also spent "several hundred thousand dollars" to develop powerful, compact diesel engines, among them the troublesome Hooven-Owens-Rentschler, which proved useful for railroads.
