Proof of impossibility
A proof of impossibility, also known as negative proof, proof of an impossibility theorem, or negative result, is a proof demonstrating that a particular problem cannot be solved as described in the claim, or that a particular set of problems cannot be solved in general. Proofs of impossibility often put decades or centuries of work attempting to find a solution to rest. To prove that something is impossible is usually much harder than the opposite task; as it is often necessary to develop a theory. Impossibility theorems are usually expressible as negative existential propositions, or universal propositions in logic.
Perhaps one of the oldest proofs of impossibility is that of the irrationality of square root of 2, which shows that it is impossible to express the square root of 2 as a ratio of integers. Another famous proof of impossibility was the 1882 proof of Ferdinand von Lindemann, showing that the ancient problem of squaring the circle cannot be solved, because the number Pi| is transcendental and only a subset of the algebraic numbers can be constructed by compass and straightedge. Two other classical problems—trisecting the general angle and doubling the cube—were also proved impossible in the 19th century.
A problem arising in the 16th century was that of creating a general formula using radicals expressing the solution of any polynomial equation of fixed degree k, where k ≥ 5. In the 1820s, the Abel–Ruffini theorem showed this to be impossible, using concepts such as solvable groups from Galois theory—a new subfield of abstract algebra.
Among the most important proofs of impossibility of the 20th century were those related to undecidability, which showed that there are problems that cannot be solved in general by any algorithm at all, with the most famous one being the halting problem. Other similarly-related findings are those of the Gödel's incompleteness theorems, which uncovers some fundamental limitations in the provability of formal systems.
In computational complexity theory, techniques like relativization provide "weak" proofs of impossibility excluding certain proof techniques. Other techniques, such as proofs of completeness for a complexity class, provide evidence for the difficulty of problems, by showing them to be just as hard to solve as other known problems that have proved intractable.
Types of impossibility proof
Proof by contradiction
One widely used type of impossibility proof is proof by contradiction. In this type of proof, it is shown that if something, such as a solution to a particular class of equations, were possible, then two mutually contradictory things would be true, such as a number being both even and odd. The contradiction implies that the original premise is impossible.Proof by descent
One type of proof by contradiction is proof by descent, which proceeds first by assuming that something is possible, such as a positive integer solution to a class of equations, and that therefore there must be a smallest solution. From the alleged smallest solution, it is then shown that a smaller solution can be found, contradicting the premise that the former solution was the smallest one possible—thereby showing that the original premise must be false.Types of disproof of impossibility conjectures
There are two alternative methods of disproving a conjecture that something is impossible: by counterexample and by logical contradiction.The obvious way to disprove an impossibility conjecture by providing a single counterexample. For example, Euler proposed that at least n different nth powers were necessary to sum to yet another nth power. The conjecture was disproved in 1966, with a counterexample involving a count of only four different 5th powers summing to another fifth power:
A proof by counterexample is a constructive proof, in that an object disproving the claim is exhibited. In contrast, a non-constructive proof of an impossibility claim would proceed by showing it is logically contradictory for all possible counterexamples to be invalid: At least one of the items on a list of possible counterexamples must actually be a valid counterexample to the impossibility conjecture. For example, a conjecture that it is impossible for an irrational power raised to an irrational power to be rational was disproved, by showing that one of two possible counterexamples must be a valid counterexample, without showing which one it is.
The existence of irrational numbers: The Pythagoreans' proof
The proof by Pythagoras about 500 BCE has had a profound effect on mathematics. It shows that the square root of 2 cannot be expressed as the ratio of two integers. The proof bifurcated "the numbers" into two non-overlapping collections—the rational numbers and the irrational numbers. This bifurcation was used by Cantor in his diagonal method, which in turn was used by Turing in his proof that the Entscheidungsproblem, the decision problem of Hilbert, is undecidable.Proofs followed for various square roots of the primes up to 17.
There is a famous passage in Plato's Theaetetus in which it is stated that Teodorus proved the irrationality of
taking all the separate cases up to the root of 17 square feet ... .
A more general proof now exists that:
That is, it is impossible to express the mth root of an integer N as the ratio of two integers a and b, that share no common prime factor except in cases in which b = 1.
Impossible constructions sought by the ancient Greeks
Three famous questions of Greek geometry were how:- ... with compass and straight-edge to trisect any angle,
- to construct a cube with a volume twice the volume of a given cube
- to construct a square equal in area to that of a given circle.
A fourth problem of the ancient Greeks was to construct an equilateral polygon with a specified number n of sides, beyond the basic cases n = 3, 4, 5 that they knew how to construct.
All of these are problems in Euclidean construction, and Euclidean constructions can be done only if they involve only Euclidean numbers . Irrational numbers can be Euclidean. A good example is the irrational number the square root of 2. It is simply the length of the hypotenuse of a right triangle with legs both one unit in length, and it can be constructed with straightedge and compass. But it was proved centuries after Euclid that Euclidean numbers cannot involve any operations other than addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and the extraction of square roots.
Angle trisection and doubling the cube
Both trisecting the general angle and doubling the cube require taking cube roots, which are not constructible numbers by compass and straightedge.Squaring the circle
is not a Euclidean number... and therefore it is impossible to construct, by Euclidean methods a length equal to the circumference of a circle of unit diameter
A proof exists to demonstrate that any Euclidean number is an algebraic number—a number that is the solution to some polynomial equation. Therefore, because was proved in 1882 to be a transcendental number and thus by definition not an algebraic number, it is not a Euclidean number. Hence the construction of a length from a unit circle is impossible, and the circle cannot be squared.
Constructing an equilateral ''n''-gon
The Gauss-Wantzel theorem showed in 1837 that constructing an equilateral n-gon is impossible for most values of n.Euclid's parallel axiom
Nagel and Newman consider the question raised by the parallel postulate to be "...perhaps the most significant development in its long-range effects upon subsequent mathematical history".The question is: can the axiom that two parallel lines "...will not meet even 'at infinity'" be derived from the other axioms of Euclid's geometry? It was not until work in the nineteenth century by "... Gauss, Bolyai, Lobachevsky, and Riemann, that the impossibility of deducing the parallel axiom from the others was demonstrated. This outcome was of the greatest intellectual importance....a proof can be given of the impossibility of proving certain propositions within a given system ".
Fermat's Last Theorem
was conjectured by Pierre de Fermat in the 1600s, states the impossibility of finding solutions in positive integers for the equation with. Fermat himself gave a proof for the n = 4 case using his technique of infinite descent, and other special cases were subsequently proved, but the general case was not proved until 1994 by Andrew Wiles.Richard's paradox
This profound paradox presented by Jules Richard in 1905 informed the work of Kurt Gödel and Alan Turing. A succinct definition is found in Principia Mathematica:Kurt Gödel considered his proof to be “an analogy” of Richard's paradox, which he called “Richard's antinomy”. See more below about Gödel's proof.
Alan Turing constructed this paradox with a machine and proved that this machine could not answer a simple question: will this machine be able to determine if any machine will become trapped in an unproductive ‘infinite loop’.
Can this theorem be proved from these axioms? Gödel's proof
To quote Nagel and Newman, "Gödel's paper is difficult. Forty-six preliminary definitions, together with several important preliminary theorems, must be mastered before the main results are reached". In fact, Nagel and Newman required a 67-page introduction to their exposition of the proof. But if the reader feels strong enough to tackle the paper, Martin Davis observes that "This remarkable paper is not only an intellectual landmark, but is written with a clarity and vigor that makes it a pleasure to read". It is recommended that most readers see Nagel and Newman first.So what did Gödel prove? In his own words:
Gödel compared his proof to "Richard's antinomy" :
Will this computing machine lock in a "circle"? Turing's first proof
- The Entscheidungsproblem, the decision problem, was first answered by Church in April 1935 and preempted Turing by over a year, as Turing's paper was received for publication in May 1936..
- Turing's proof is made difficult by number of definitions required and its subtle nature. See Turing machine and Turing's proof for details.
- Turing's first proof follows the schema of Richard's paradox: Turing's computing machine is an algorithm represented by a string of seven letters in a "computing machine". Its "computation" is to test all computing machines for "circles", and form a diagonal number from the computations of the non-circular or "successful" computing machines. It does this, starting in sequence from 1, by converting the numbers into strings of seven letters to test. When it arrives at its own number, it creates its own letter-string. It decides it is the letter-string of a successful machine, but when it tries to do this machine's computation it locks in a circle and can't continue. Thus we have arrived at Richard's paradox..
- April 1935: Proof of Alonzo Church. His proof was to "...propose a definition of effective calculability... and to show, by means of an example, that not every problem of this class is solvable" )
- 1946: Post correspondence problem
- April 1947: Proof of Emil Post . This has since become known as "The Word problem of Thue" or "Thue's Word Problem".
- Rice's theorem: a generalized formulation of Turing's second theorem
- Greibach's theorem: undecidability in language theory
- Penrose tiling questions
- Question of solutions for Diophantine equations and the resultant answer in the MRDP Theorem; see entry below.
Can this string be compressed? Chaitin's proof
A string is called random if it cannot be produced from any shorter computer program. While most strings are random, no particular one can be proved so, except for finitely many short ones:
Beltrami observes that "Chaitin's proof is related to a paradox posed by Oxford librarian G. Berry early in the twentieth century that asks for 'the smallest positive integer that cannot be defined by an English sentence with fewer than 1000 characters.' Evidently, the shortest definition of this number must have at least 1000 characters. However, the sentence within quotation marks, which is itself a definition of the alleged number is less than 1000 characters in length!"
Does this Diophantine equation have an integer solution? Hilbert's tenth problem
The question "Does any arbitrary "Diophantine equation" have an integer solution?" is undecidable.That is, it is impossible to answer the question for all cases.Franzén introduces Hilbert's tenth problem and the MRDP theorem which states that "no algorithm exists which can decide whether or not a Diophantine equation has any solution at all". MRDP uses the undecidability proof of Turing: "... the set of solvable Diophantine equations is an example of a computably enumerable but not decidable set, and the set of unsolvable Diophantine equations is not computably enumerable".
In social science
In political science, Arrow's impossibility theorem states that it is impossible to devise a voting system that satisfies a set of five specific axioms. This theorem is proved by showing that four of the axioms together imply the opposite of the fifth.In economics, Holmström's theorem is an impossibility theorem proving that no incentive system for a team of agents can satisfy all of three desirable criteria.
In natural science
In natural science, impossibility assertions come to be widely accepted as overwhelmingly probable rather than considered proved to the point of being unchallengeable. The basis for this strong acceptance is a combination of extensive evidence of something not occurring, combined with an underlying theory, very successful in making predictions, whose assumptions lead logically to the conclusion that something is impossible.Two examples of widely accepted impossibilities in physics are perpetual motion machines, which violate the law of conservation of energy, and exceeding the speed of light, which violates the implications of special relativity. Another is the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics, which asserts the impossibility of simultaneously knowing both the position and the momentum of a particle. Also Bell's theorem: no physical theory of local hidden variables can ever reproduce all of the predictions of quantum mechanics.
While an impossibility assertion in science can never be absolutely proved, it could be refuted by the observation of a single counterexample. Such a counterexample would require that the assumptions underlying the theory that implied the impossibility be re-examined.