Operation Safed Sagar
Operation Safed Sagar was the code name assigned to the Indian Air Force's role in acting jointly with the Ground troops during the Kargil war that was aimed at flushing out regular and irregular troops of the Pakistani Army from vacated Indian Positions in the Kargil sector along the Line of Control. It was the first large scale use of Airpower in the Jammu and Kashmir region since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.
Ground operations
Initial infiltrations were noticed in Kargil in early May, 1999. Because of the extreme winter weather in Kashmir, it was common practice for the Indian and Pakistan Army to abandon forward posts and reoccupy them in the spring. That particular spring, the Pakistan Army started reoccupying the forward posts well before the scheduled time. In a preliminary step in their bid to capture Kashmir, they reoccupied not only their own posts, but also 132 posts that belonged to India.By the second week of May, an ambush on an Indian army patrol acting on a tip-off by a local shepherd in the Batalik sector led to the exposure of the infiltration. Initially with little knowledge of the nature or extent of the encroachment, the Indian troops in the area initially claimed that they would evict them within a few days. However, reports of infiltration elsewhere along the LoC soon made it clear that the entire plan of attack was on a much bigger scale. India responded with Operation Vijay, a mobilisation of 200,000 Indian troops. However, because of the nature of the terrain, division and corps operations could not be mounted; the scale of most fighting was at the regimental or battalion level. In effect, two divisions of the Indian Army, numbering 20,000, along with several thousand from the Paramilitary forces of India and the air force were deployed in the conflict zone.
the Indian Army moved into the region in full force. The intruders were found to be well entrenched and while artillery attacks had produced results in certain areas, more remote ones needed the help of the air force. The Indian Govt cleared only limited use of Air Power on May 25, more than three weeks after first reports, for fear of undesirable escalation, with the fiat that IAF fighter jets were not to cross the Line of Control under any circumstance. This diktat prevented the IAF from attacking Pakistani outposts from the optimal line of attack, but had far reaching consequences, in that it later led to immense international pressure- initiated by the US- on Pakistan to withdraw from the Kargil sector.
Air operations
As winter withdrew, sunrise cast shadows in the valleys from 8AM, when visibility was considerably reduced and targets could not be seen. Low clouds engulfed the ridges and peaks by 11AM. The window of opportunity was restricted to the three-hour period between 8AM and 11AM, provided there was no drizzle. The Indian Air Force had been carrying out routine Electronic intelligence, photo and Aerial reconnaissance since early May in such weather. On May 21, a Canberra PR57 from 106 Squadron on a reconnaissance mission, flown by Wg Cdr CH Kulkarni, Sqn Ldr A Perumal and Sqn Ldr UK Jha, was hit by a Chinese-made Anza infrared surface-to-air missile. The plane returned to the nearest IAF base, Srinagar, on one engine, and the crew landed safely. The Indian Govt, intent on not provoking escalation, cleared limited use of offensive and defensive Air Power only on May 25, restricted entirely to the Indian side of the Line of Control. There was no opposition at all by the Pakistani Air Force, leaving the IAF free to carry out its attacks with impunity.India's request to use the military version of the space-based Global Positioning System navigation software maintained by the US government was denied. The IAF was thus constrained to use only the civilian application of the GPS, with reduced accuracy. The Indian Air Force flew its first air support missions on 26 May, operating from the Indian airfields of Srinagar, Awantipora and Adampur. Ground attack aircraft MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-27s, Jaguars and helicopter gunships struck insurgent positions. The Mirage 2000 fleet was inducted on 30 May. Although the MiG-21 is built mainly for air interception with a secondary role of ground attack, it is capable of operating in restricted spaces, albeit with limited influence, which was of importance in the Kargil terrain. Even so, the IAF's ageing fleet of MiG-21s and the MiG-27s operated without modern navigation equipment and pilots strapped GPS gadgets to their thighs or held them in whichever hand was free. The MiG fleet was tasked with dropping leftover 500 and 1000-kg bombs from the 1965 and 1971 wars and, in concert with the Army, selecting bomb impact points which would snowball into landslides or avalanches. The aim was to cut off Pak transit lines to such an extent that even the wounded could not be evacuated.
The initial strikes had the Air Defence versions of the MiG-21s and MiG-29s providing fighter cover. Mil Mi-17 gunships were also deployed in the Tololing sector. Srinagar Airport was at this time closed to civilian air-traffic and dedicated to the Indian Air Force.
The first fatality was suffered on May 27 when a MiG-27 crashed due to engine flame-out and a MiG-21 was shot down by the Pakistan Army, both over Batalik sector. The MiG-27, piloted by Flt Lt K Nachiketa, suffered an engine flameout due to the ingestion of the exhaust gas of the weapons fired. Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, who was escorting Nachiketa in his MiG-21 tried to trace the downed MiG-27 despite the potent threat in the form of enemy Surface to Air Missiles and his plane was shot down by a Stinger shoulder fired missile. It is believed by the Indian military that he survived the crash but was killed by Pakistan Army soldiers or irregulars. The body of Ahuja bore two point-blank bullet wounds as per the postmortem done by the Indian authorities. The point-blank injuries clearly indicated the intent of the enemy and the treatment a violation of Geneva conventions. Flt Lt Nachiketa was later paraded on Pakistan TV; this prompted India to accuse Pakistan of violating the Geneva convention on the treatment of Prisoners of War.
The following day, a Mi-17 was shot down- with the loss of all four of the crew- when it was hit by three Stinger missiles while on an offensive sortie in the Tololing sector. These losses forced the Indian Air Force to reassess its strategy. The helicopters were immediately withdrawn from offensive roles as a measure against the man-portable air defence systems in possession of the infiltrators.
Starting May 30, the LGB capable Mirage 2000, which was deemed the best aircraft in the IAF inventory capable of optimum performance under the conditions of high-altitude seen in the zone of conflict, was used extensively. Armed initially with 250 kg "dumb" bombs, No. 7 Squadron led by Wg Cdr Sandeep Chabra, struck over three days infiltrator positions in Muntho Dhalo, Tiger Hill and Point 4388 in the Drass Sector. The receding snowline in June laid bare the hitherto camouflaged Pakistani positions, opening them up to non-stop day and night attacks by the Mirage 2000 and, subsequently, all aircraft.
The IAF also used the MiG-25R – which normally cruises at 65-80,000 ft and M 2.3 – at medium altitude and Mach nos for high resolution pictures, something that its Russian designers may never have contemplated. The Mig-25 needed some quick alterations to their pre-programmed algorithms to fly so low and slow. In all such photo missions, they were escorted by a pair of Mirage 2000H aircraft.
Initial non-availability of laser bombs
The ATLIS II/ Bombe Guidée Laser Arcole 1000 kg bombs combo bought by India for the Mirage 2000 was not suited to the Kargil sector. The Atlis II is a French daylight/clear-weather laser/electro-optical targeting pod and was specifically ordered for targeting Command and Control recessed sites/bunkers and controlling the deep-penetrating highly expensive BGL. The pod had operating problems at very high altitudes and were taken off inventory for this war. In its place, the IAF had bought a number of the very much cheaper US Paveway II laser-guided bomb kits for use with the Israeli Litening laser designator pods, but certain parts of the Paveway kit were not available as they were placed under embargo by the US as a fallout of the nuclear test performed by India. Consequently IAF technicians had to remanufacture this part in order to make the Paveway serviceable for use on the Mirage 2000. The lasing time of the Litening pods required manual alteration as the Mirage computer protocol was not known. Fuzes were not available for the 1000lb bombs, so pistol fuzes were modified and proved effective. Wing pylon clearance for carrying 1000lb leftover bombs from the earlier wars and possibly even WWII was done at Gwalior, its home base. The Litening LDPs were also used for recce, to try and primarily locate the largest logistics camps.
The Mirage 2000 was thus initially limited to dumb bombs. 1000lb bombs were soon made available. Both were dropped using the onboard CCRP sighting technique, which required minor tinkering to adjust for reduced air density and concomitant variation in ballistic trajectory when hitting targets at heights 6,000’ to 18,000’ AMSL and keeping outside any MANPADS launch range. On June 16, the opposing force's primary supply depot was located at Muntho Dalo in the Batalik sector. The next day, June 17, Mirage 2000s destroyed the enemy’s main administrative and logistics depot at Muntho Dhalo, using the 1,000-pound dumb bombs with both demoralising and paralysing results. The story was repeated on June 23, 1999, when another large Logistics Camp was spotted using the Litening LDP at Pt 4388 in Mashkoh Nallah. This camp was struck next morning by two Mirage 2000 aircraft using dumb bombs, inflicting large scale casualties on enemy forces located at that ‘hideout’. Remnants of this camp were destroyed on July 10.
Through the last weeks of June, the Mirages, armed with LGBs as well as with "dumbs", repeatedly struck the heavily defended Tiger Hill. Interestingly, only 9 LGBs were used in this war, 8 by the Mirage and one by a Jaguar, as the dumb bombs proved highly effective. The first ever IAF LGB mission, that too at high altitude, was carried out in a Mirage 2000 two-seater on June 24, flown by then Wg Cdr R Nambiar with then Sqn Ldr Monish Yadav in the rear seat, accompanied by another two-seater as back up, and observed by the Chief of Air Staff, ACM AY Tipnis, in yet another two-seater. All LGBs were delivered by two-seaters, with the rear-seat pilot doubling up as a WSO. The first ever night LGB mission was flown with a time over target, Tiger Hill, of 0230 IST Jun 28, 1999 with Sqn Ldr Patnaik in the front seat and Wg Cdr Nambiar in the rear. Achieving a direct hit as reported by the Army, this mission was considered instrumental in paving the way for ground forces to capture Tiger Hill.
The Mirage 2000 proved its worth in this war. Such was its accuracy with dumb bombs that an LGB-equipped two-seater would join up as the tail of a 2 or 4-ship formation of other Mirages carrying between 6-12 dumb bombs each, film their attacks, and only if the results were less than optimal, or if it had spotted a Command and Control bunker on its Litening sensor / camera, let loose its LGB. The IAF therefore used the LGB selectively.
All aircraft operated at an altitude of 9-10,000 metres,, diving when required and pulling out well out of MANPADs range. The low number of airstrips for take off and landing of the flights also constrained the regularity and efficiency of the attacks. Despite this, there were hundreds of sorties on the intruders with no further material or personnel casualties enabling a gradual takeover of the mountain posts by Indian troops. The IAF's ageing fleet of MiG-21s and the MiG-27s operated without modern navigation equipment. The MiG fleet was, as required by the Army, dropping 500 and 1000-kg bombs at select impact points to initiate landslides or avalanches. This cut off Pak transit lines to such an extent that even the wounded could not be evacuated. According to the IAF, the "air strikes against the Pakistani infiltrators, supply camps and other targets yielded rich dividends." The Mirage 2000 was looked upon as the aircraft that turned the tide of the Kargil War.
July 01 saw the beginning of the end of the one-sided conflict. Tiger Hill fell on July 04. In the absence of enemy activity, targets for airstrikes were not always available; "Search and Destroy" missions were launched to find and attack targets of opportunity. By the evening of July 10, the war was virtually over. That morning, three Mirage-2000 aircraft obliterated Pt 4388 in an accurate air strike with 15x1000 Lb bombs. The effect of these lethal attacks was summed up by a message received from one of the field headquarters of the Army: "You guys have done a wonderful job. Your Mirage boys targeted an enemy Battalion HQ in Tiger Hill area with tremendous success. Five Kashmiri separatists officers reported killed in that attack and their Command and Control broke down – as a result of which our troops have literally walked over the entire Tiger Hills area." On July 11, the Directors General of Military Operations of India and Pakistan met, at the latter's request, to discuss the modalities of the Pak withdrawal.
All remaining intruders were withdrawn and the operation was ended, being declared a success by the IAF in having achieved its primary objectives. However, there has also been criticism of the methods initially used and the type of planes being unsuitable to the terrain that resulted in early losses. This is believed by many in the Air force as coming as a wake up call to upgrade the ageing fleet of aircraft to better enable them to fight in the mountainous region. But, in the context of the war and in light of the poor information available on the infiltrations, the Indian Air Force was able to coordinate well with the Army and provide air support to the recapture of most the posts before Pakistan decided to withdraw its remaining troops.
Summary of Air Effort
Breakdown of Total Number of Sorties Flown by Aircraft Type:| Type | Number of Sorties | % Effort |
| Transport | 3427 | 44.9% |
| Heptrs | 2474 | 32.4% |
| Fighters | 1730 | 22.7% |
| Total | 7831 |
Breakdown of Air Operations by Task
| Role | Number of Sorties | % Effort |
| Air Strikes | 578 | 48% |
| CAP & Escort | 462 | 39% |
| Recce | 159 | 13% |
| Total | 1199 |
Source: IAF and MoD Annual Report