Operation Coat was a reinforcement convoy from Britain to Malta, carrying troops and anti-aircraft guns. The convoy was made up of the battleship, heavy cruisers and and three escorting destroyers. It was covered by the aircraft carrier, light cruiser and three more destroyers, all from Force H, out to mid-Mediterranean; three Force H destroyers would remain, the rest turning back from Sicily.
Convoy MW 3
Convoy MW 3 was made up of three empty merchantmen bound for Malta from Alexandria, plus an Australian destroyer and the monitor bound for the base at Suda Bay in Crete. The convoy was escorted by the anti-aircraft cruiser, accompanied by three destroyers. The convoy left Alexandria on 4 November and reached Malta on 10 November.
Convoy ME 3 comprised four merchantmen sailing in ballast from Malta to Alexandria, under escort of the battleship, Coventry, and two destroyers. The convoy sailed from Malta on 10 November and arrived in Alexandria on 13 November.
Convoy AN 6
Convoy AN 6 consisted of four slowtankers bound for Greece from Egypt, in support of the British expedition there, escorted by a slow trawler. Shaping a similar course were reinforcements for Crete, embarked in the light cruisers and as Force B, while Force C, the light cruiser transported RAF supplies to Greece and inspected Suda Bay. All three would rejoin to form Force X for an 11/12 November raid on the Otranto Strait.
Operation Crack
Operation Crack was an attack on Cagliari by aircraft from Ark Royal, en route to Malta, branching off from Operation Coat.
Operation Judgement, under the command of Admiral Andrew Cunningham, was executed by aircraft from the carrier, escorted by battleships Ramilies,, and. They met the heavy cruisers and and three destroyers, then escorting Convoy MW 3, and provided cover. A rendezvous with the Barham group from Operation Coat was to be met, with Illustrious, Gloucester, York and Berwick detaching to attack Taranto, coincident with the Force X raid. The Italians were aware of sorties from Alexandria and Gibraltar by 7 November and sent nine submarines to attack a Malta convoy detected on 8 November. Bombers failed even to pinpoint the Judgement force and when Force H was detected headed back toward Gibraltar on 9 November, the Italians presumed MW 3 had turned around, too. Italian confusion arose when Barham, Berwick, Glasgow and their destroyers were detected 10 November off Lemnos. The correct deduction, they had detached from the Gibraltar-bound force, was not accompanied by a correct guess they would join with Cunningham. The same day, Ramillies, Coventry and two destroyers protecting ME 3 were detected and again, bombers failed even to locate them. The complexity of Operation MB8, with its various forces and convoys, deceived the Italians into thinking only normal convoying was underway. While Italian reconnaissance was characteristically bad, in the end, the Italians had only failed to keep track of Illustrious. That the Italians expected the British to behave in what was, at the time, their usual way was the root of the mistake.
