In mathematical logic, Löb's theorem states that in Peano arithmetic , for any formula P, if it is provable in PA that "if P is provable in PA then P is true", then P is provable in PA. More formally, if Prov means that the formula P is provable, then or An immediate corollary of Löb's theorem is that, if P is not provable in PA, then "if P is provable in PA, then P is true" is not provable in PA. For example, "If is provable in PA, then " is not provable in PA. Löb's theorem is named for Martin Hugo Löb, who formulated it in 1955.
abstracts away from the details of encodings used in Gödel's incompleteness theorems by expressing the provability of in the given system in the language of modal logic, by means of the modality. Then we can formalize Löb's theorem by the axiom known as axiom GL, for Gödel-Löb. This is sometimes formalized by means of an inference rule that infers from The provability logic GL that results from taking the modal logic K4 and adding the above axiom GL is the most intensely investigated system in provability logic.
Modal proof of Löb's theorem
Löb's theorem can be proved within modal logic using only some basic rules about the provability operator plus the existence of modal fixed points.
Modal formulas
We will assume the following grammar for formulas:
A modal sentence is a modal formula that contains no propositional variables. We use to mean is a theorem.
Modal fixed points
If is a modal formula with only one propositional variable, then a modal fixed point of is a sentence such that We will assume the existence of such fixed points for every modal formula with one free variable. This is of course not an obvious thing to assume, but if we interpret as provability in Peano Arithmetic, then the existence of modal fixed points is in fact true.
An immediate corollary of Löb's theorem is that, if P is not provable in PA, then "if P is provable in PA, then P is true" is not provable in PA. Given we know PA is consistent, here are some simple examples:
"If is provable in PA, then " is not provable in PA, as is not provable in PA.
"If is provable in PA, then " is provable in PA, as is any statement of the form "If X, then ".
"If the strengthened finite Ramsey theorem is provable in PA, then the strengthened finite Ramsey theorem is true" is not provable in PA, as "The strengthened finite Ramsey theorem is true" is not provable in PA.
In Doxastic logic, Löb's theorem shows that any system classified as a reflexive "type 4" reasoner must also be "modest": such a reasoner can never believe "my belief in P would imply that P is true", without first believing that P is true.
Converse: Löb's theorem implies the existence of modal fixed points
Not only does the existence of modal fixed points imply Löb's theorem, but the converse is valid, too. When Löb's theorem is given as an axiom, the existence of a fixed point for any formula A' modalized in p can be derived. Thus in normal modal logic, Löb's axiom is equivalent to the conjunction of the axiom schema 4''',, and the existence of modal fixed points.