Independent Air Flight 1851
On 8 February 1989, Independent Air Flight 1851, a Boeing 707 on an American charter flight from Bergamo, Italy to Punta Cana, Dominican Republic, struck Pico Alto while on approach to Santa Maria Airport in the Azores for a scheduled stopover. The aircraft was destroyed, with the loss of all 144 on board, resulting in the deadliest plane crash in Portugal's history. Due to the large number of tourists from Italy that perished in this tragedy, it is known in Italian as “Il disastro delle Azorre".
Aircraft and crew
Aircraft
The aircraft was a 21-year-old Boeing 707 that had been built in 1968, and made its first flight on 22 March the same year. It had been previously operated by Trans World Airlines.Crew
The flight crew consisted of Captain Leon James Daugherty, 41, first officer Sammy Adcock, 36, and flight engineer Jorge Gonzalez, 34.Daugherty had 7,766 flying hours, including 766 hours on the Boeing 707. He also had 2,259 hours on the Boeing 727.
Adcock had a total of 3,764 flying hours, including 64 hours on the Boeing 707. Gonzalez had a total of 6,756 flying hours, including 1,056 hours on the Boeing 707, He also had 2,888 hours on the Boeing 727 and 2,823 hours on the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy.
Sequence of events
Preceding events
The flight crew previously flew on 3 February to Montego Bay. On 4 February they flew to Fort Worth, then to Denver, Colorado. On 5 February, the crew returned to Montego Bay, where they received their assignment for 1851 flight from Milan, Italy to Punta Cana, Dominican Republic, with a scheduled stopover in Santa Maria, Azores, Portugal. On 7 February, after a flight of 10 hours and 40 minutes, the crew arrived in Genoa. Italy, having to divert from Milan Malpensa Airport due to poor weather. The crew arrived in Bergamo three hours later. which was located near the planned departure airport. The crew spent next 46 hours in a hotel, their activities being unknown. However, in the early morning of 9 February, a witness stated that everyone left the hotel in a good mood.Departure was scheduled for 08:00 GMT, but because of inclement fog, the aircraft was delayed in Genoa and was able to land at Bergamo Airport only at 07:20. According to the flight plan, the duration of the first part of the flight was to be 4 hours and 10 minutes, landing on runway 33. It is also worth noting that in terms of flight, the airport coordinates were given as N36756 and W025096, with the runway elevation being 0 feet. But the coordinates indicated did not correspond to either the charts nor any of the aircraft's navigation equipment, and the actual level of the airfield is. Also during the investigation it was noted that the air navigation charts for this airport were out dated by 27 years, with the last update having been on 1 February 1962.
At 10:04, flight IDN 1851 with 7 crew members and 137 passengers on board departed Bergamo Airport.
Accident
Flight 1851 had communication difficulties with air traffic controllers at high frequencies, although it worked without failures on the ground. At 12:46:33, the crew contacted the Santa Maria Air Traffic Control center and reported on the passage point.. Flight 1851 was handled by a trainee air traffic controller. As the investigators later noted, phraseology was violated during the communications. The controller also used the word "point" instead of "decimal," meaning a decimal point. Radio communication with the land was conducted mainly by the first officer Adcock, with the exception at 13:43:57 when flight engineer Gonzalez requested a weather report. At 13:44:20 the controller transmitted: "One eight five one wind two six zero... Fourteen ah fourteen knots maximum two four knots visibility more than ten kilometers one octa at one two zero zero feet six octa at three thousand feet ah temperature one seven QNH one zero one niner." During the transmission, the controller used non-standard terminology "at" in the sentence, "ne octant for one two zero zero." Due to the communication difficulties, the crew heard the message as "one octant two two zero zero," from which the falsely determined that there were no clouds below 2,000 feet.At 13:56:47, when flight 1851 was performing a descent to the airfield and passing a train of 220, the controller dispatched: "Independent Air one eight five one roger you're cleared to three thousand feet on QNH one zero two seven and ah runway will be one niner." The controller made a major error during this transmission. He had reported to the crew about the reduced pressure of 1027 hPa, when it was actually 1018.7,, which is 9 hPa lower. The instructor noticed this and wanted to transmit the correct information to the crew, but he was distracted by a phone call. Also, the crew members themselves failed to notice the transfer of high pressure, which 12 minutes earlier was much lower. This could have been facilitated by the presence of a flight attendant in the cockpit, whose voice was recorded by the Cockpit Voice Recorder at 13:48:30 and at 14:04:09.
At 13:56:59 the co-pilot told the controller: "We're cleared to two thousand feet and ah...," but paused mid-sentence at 13:57:02. At that same time Daugherty said, "Make it three ." Then 13:57:07 Adcock continued: "one zero two seven." This was the last transmission from Flight 1851, but the controller did not hear the first part, as he continued to say that the flight would be landing on runway 19, and therefore did not know that the plane continued to descend to 2,000 feet. This was below the minimum safe altitude of 3,000 feet, the aircraft was flying straight to the mountain.
At 14:02, at a speed of 260 knots, the plane passed a height of 6500 feet and got into a zone of light turbulence. At 14:03 Adcock stated, "Ah after two thousand yeah we'll get below these clouds." At 14:06 at a speed of 250 knots, and at a height of the airliner experienced heavy turbulence near Santo Espírito, with Daugherty saying at 14:07:52, "Can't keep this son of a bitch thing straight up and down." Adcock asked Daugherty if he needed help, to with Daugherty replied, "no." Then at 14:08:00 due to turbulence, the height climbed sharply from to. The radio altimeter then gave a warning signal. Seconds later the Ground Proximity Warning System activated, sounding several "whoop whoop pull up" audible alarms and lasted for more than 5 seconds, also having been activated in the climb due to turbulence. But the crew did not respond to warnings.
At 14:08:12, at an actual altitude of above sea level, the aircraft crashed into a wall by a road, skidded through trees with trunks about 30-40 centimeters in diameter, and exploded. The impact occurred on the east side, but the site was so close to the top that some of the debris was on the western slope of the mountain. All 144 people on board were killed. This is the deadliest aviation disaster to occur in Portugal and the fourth deadliest involving a Boeing 707.
Investigation
The altimeters found at the crash site had an exhibited pressure of 1028 and 1026 hPa, and their height read 2,000 feet. The overestimation of pressure by 9 hPa led to an overestimation of readings by 240 feet, but taking into account the distance to the summit and the height of trees growing on the mountain, it was concluded that this difference did not contribute to the accident.The official investigation determined that during approach to Santa Maria Airport, the air traffic controller instructed the crew to descend to for an ILS approach to runway 19.
During that transmission, a trainee controller had also transmitted an incorrect QNH that was 9 hPa too high. The approach instructions were not fully heard since the pilot had re-keyed his microphone to acknowledge the new QNH, and likely did not hear the second repeat of the 3,000 ft safe altitude, declaring: "We’re re-cleared to 2,000 feet...". Although the first officer questioned the barometric altitude, the captain agreed that the first officer had heard the read-back correctly.
After having been cleared to the ILS approach, the crew failed to accomplish the approach briefing, missing an opportunity to notice the 3,000 ft minimum safe altitude and the presence of Pico Alto.
Leveling off at, the airliner experienced heavy turbulence near Santo Espírito and subsequently impacted the ridge of Pico Alto in a level attitude at an altitude of. There was no evidence of any in-flight emergency and the altimeter was found correctly set to 1027 mb.
Conclusions
The Board of Inquiry concluded that the accident was due to non-observance by the crew of established operating procedures which led to the deliberate descent of the aircraft to 2000 feet when the published minimum sector altitude was 3000 feet. It also found that the controller had put the aircraft below that indicated on board the aircraft, exacerbating the original error by the first officer.Other factors:
- Bad communications techniques on the part of the co-pilot and controller, including the non-adherence to standard phraseology in some of the ground communication.
- Neglecting aerodrome control tower procedures in not requesting a readback of the descent clearance.
- The limited international flying experience of the crew and the airline's deficient crew training that did not include emergency maneuvering techniques for terrain avoidance.
- Non-compliance with the National Institute of Civil Aviation of Portugal Aeronautical Information Publications.
Lawsuit
The case was settled for $34,000,000.