Evolution of Pakistan Eastern Command plan


The Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army was a corps-sized military formation headed by an appointed lieutenant-general, who was designated the Commander of the Eastern Command. After the partition of India by Great Britain, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was divided into two territories separated by . Most of the assets of the Pakistan armed forces were stationed in West Pakistan; the role of the Pakistan armed forces in East Pakistan was to hold that part of the country until the Pakistani forces defeated India in the west. The Pakistan Army created the Eastern Command, with one commander in the rank of Lieutenant General responsible for the command. The armed forces, had drawn up a plan to defend Dhaka by concentrating all their forces along the Dhaka Bowl.
After Pakistan launched Operation Searchlight and Operation Barisal to curb the Awami League-led political movement in March 1971, Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi revised the existing plan according to the Pakistan Army's General Headquarters directive. HQ expected the Indians to occupy a large area of the province, transfer the Mukti Bahini and Bengali refugees there and recognise the Bangladesh government in exile – turning the insurgency into an international diplomatic issue. Lieutenant General Niazi designated 10 cities on major communication hubs as "fortress towns" and placed the bulk of his troops near the Indian border. The final plan called for the armed forces to delay Indian attacks at the border and then gradually fall back to the fortress towns. From the fortresses, part of the surviving force was to take up positions near Dhaka and hold out until India was defeated in the west; Pakistani forces in the fortress towns would delay the bulk of the Indian forces and prevent them from concentrating on Dhaka.

Background

The Pakistan Army inherited six infantry divisions and an armoured brigade after independence in 1947 from the British Indian Army, deploying most of their armed assets in West Pakistan. East Pakistan had one infantry brigade in 1948, which was made up of two infantry battalions, the 1st East Bengal Regiment and the 1/14th or 3/8th Punjab Regiment. Between them, the two battalions boasted five rifle companies. This weak brigade – under the command of Brigadier Ayub Khan – and a number of East Pakistan Rifles wings were tasked with defending East Pakistan during the Kashmir War of 1947. The Pakistan Air Force and Pakistan Navy had little presence in East Pakistan at that time. The reasons for placing more than 90 percent of the armed might in West Pakistan were:
The Pakistan Armed Forces grew exponentially in size between the wars of 1949 and 1965. The number of infantry divisions jumped from 6 to 13; it also boasted two armoured divisions and several independent infantry and armoured brigades by 1965. All these formations had the required artillery, commando, engineer and transport units attached to them. The growth in military infrastructure was slower in East Pakistan; the single division HQed at Dhaka now contained two infantry brigades, with the 53rd Brigade stationed at Comilla and the 107th Brigade deployed in Jessore by 1963. In 1964, the 23rd Brigade was created in Dhaka. This under-strength division comprised three infantry brigades, with no armour and supported by 10 EPR wings, 12 F-86 Saber planes, and three gunboats rode out the 1965 war in the east. The Air Forces had bombed each other's bases with the PAF emerging on top, while the Border Security Force and EPR had skirmished along the border; although India had one infantry division and one armoured brigade posted near East Pakistan, the armies never clashed in the east.

Reforms of Yahya Khan

When Yahya Khan became Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army in 1966, he initiated a series of reforms to revamp the combat capability of the Pakistan army. In East Pakistan a corps headquarters was to be established, but except the 14th Infantry Division, Dacca no new division was raised. In 1970, the 29th Cavalry was deployed in Rangpur from Rawalpindi, but East Pakistan was not given any corps artillery or armoured units.
The Pakistan Eastern Command headquarters was inaugurated in Dacca Cantonment, Dacca in 23 August 1969 and Lt. Gen. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan was appointed as the commander; in 1 September 1969, the Chief Martial Law Administrator of the country, General Yahya Khan, sent Vice-Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan as Martial Law Administrator of East Pakistan. Syed Mohammad Ahsan, when Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Navy, had established the naval forces in East Pakistan; the naval presence was tripled in East Pakistan with more officers from West Pakistan deployed in the region. Earlier, The Chief of the General Staff at GHQ, Rawalpindi, Major General Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, decided to run a series of exercises in East Pakistan to formulate an integrated battle plan for the province in 1967. Dubbed "Operation X-Sunderbans-1", it was run by Colonel Rao Farman Ali under the command of Major General Muzaffaruddin ; the conclusions of this exercise formed the basis for the Pakistani operational plan in 1971.

Operation X-Sundarbans-1

Pakistani planners assumed that the main Indian assault would take place on the western border of East Pakistan, and the army in East Pakistan would not defend every inch of the province. Pakistani staff planners identified the following features as significant for setting up a defence plan:
Instead of defending every inch of the land, survival of the armed forces was given top priority and the defence of Dhaka was the ultimate objective. Instead of deploying along the -long Indian border, three lines of deployment were chosen:
The Pakistani planners were aware of the possible negative political implications among the Bengali population of abandoning forward areas and concentrating the army around the Dhaka Bowl to maximise the defensive potential and achieve better co-ordination; however, it failed to come up with an alternative solution. The planners recommended taking advantage of the poor state of infrastructure and natural obstacles to the fullest.
In brief, the plan was:
Pakistani forces stationed in Sylhet and Chittagong would look after their own affairs. The planners did not devise a plan whereby East Pakistan forces would fight a self-sustained, independent action and defend the province on its own.

Operation Titu Mir

A series of exercises, codenamed "Titu Mir", was conducted by the Eastern Command in 1970; the last was staged in January. The conclusions drawn were:
The conclusions were submitted to GHQ in Rawalpindi, but no major alteration of the original plan took place at this time.

Operations Searchlight and Barisal

During 1971, Pakistan experienced riots and civil disobedience against the military dictatorship in both east and west. The positions of the Pakistan armed forces under Admiral Ahsan were changed and deployed at the borders to observe Indian intelligence efforts. The magnitude of force was also increased, and logistics efforts were improved under Admiral Ahsan's command. His two-year rule saw stability and improvement in government control of the province; however, the deployment ratio of military forces increased. The Martial law administrator of East Pakistan, Vice-Admiral S.M. Ahsan was East Pakistan's governor also. In March 1971, General Yahya Khan visited Dhaka to break the Mujib-Bhutto impasse. Lieutenant General Tikka Khan's staff at the Eastern Command headquarters was the first to present their assessment of the civil and military situation to General Yahya Khan and the army and air force's senior officers accompanying him, and Vice-Admiral Ahsan persuaded General Yahya Khan at the meeting. During this meeting, Admiral Ahsan brief ran counter to the cut-and-dried solutions of West Pakistan representatives and civil servants. The Pakistan Air Force's Air Commodore Mitty Masud stressed the importance of a political solution rather than military action. Air Commodore Masud backed Admiral Ahsan, as he believed that an autonomous East Pakistan was preferable to the certainty of military defeat if India decided to intervene. General Yahya Khan rejected Masud's arguments.
Before the start of military operations a final high-level meeting was held at the General Headquarters, where the participants were unanimously in favour of the military operation. One of the bases of the replacement was Admiral Ahsan's resignation; he opposed any military actions in the East Pakistan, and was determined to find political solutions rather than military. The GHQ generals in the army and air force were determined to curb the political movement with violence and military might. Admiral Ahsan went to East Pakistan, later returning to West Pakistan. General Yaqub Khan temporarily assumed control of the province in place of Admiral Ahsan; he was replaced by Lt. General Tikka Khan on his refusal to support military action against civilians. Once Operation Searchlight and Operation Barisal launched, Admiral Ahsan resigned from his position as Martial Law Administrator and Governor of East Pakistan, retiring from the Navy in protest. In his place, Rear Admiral Mohammad Shariff assumed the Naval Commander of East Pakistan. Air Commodore Mitty Masud was also replaced by the inexperienced officer Air Commodore Inamul Haque Khan. Masud resigned from the air force due to his apparent opposition to Operations Searchlight and Barisal. Lt. General Tikka Khan and Maj. Gen. Rao Farman Ali devised the scheme for Operation Searchlight in March 1971 within 10 days of launching the scheme. Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff, commander of the Pakistan Navy in the region, ran violent naval operations that contributed to the insurgency. The Pakistan armed forces had no reserves to meet any unforeseen events, and success depended heavily on reinforcements from West Pakistan. There was no contingency plan for any Indian military action – the main reason Generals Yakub, Khadim and Farman had opposed launching the operation. Pakistani forces occupied Bangladesh, and Gen. Gul Hassan, then Chief of General Staff of the Pakistan army, and no admirer of Gen. Niazi from 11 April 1971 – expressed satisfaction with the situation.

1971 High Command plan

The size and disposition of Pakistan combat forces in East Pakistan changed during Operation Searchlight. The 14th Division was reinforced by the 9th and the 16th Divisions —in all, fifteen infantry and one commando battalion and two heavy mortar batteries by May 1971. Until the end of 1971, General Yahya Khan's government was unable to find an active military administrator comparable to Admiral Ahsan as the civil war in East Pakistan intensified. Senior general officers and admirals were unwilling to assume the command of East Pakistan until Lieutenant-General Amir Niazi volunteered for this assignment. Lieutenant General Niazi was made the commander of the Pakistan Eastern Command. Rear Admiral Mohammed Sharif was made second-in-command of the Eastern Command.

May 1971 army redeployment

Following the change in command, the 14th Division initially had its brigades posted at Comilla, Dhaka, Rangpur and Jessore before March 1971. During Operation Searchlight the 57th and the 107th moved to Jessore, while the 53rd had relocated to Chittagong. The Eastern Command moved 9th Division HQ to Jessore, putting the 107th and the 57th under this division. The 16th Division HQ moved to Bogra, which now included the 23rd, the 205th and the 34th Brigades. The 14th Division HQ remained at Dhaka, with its brigades at Mymensingh, Sylhet and Comilla. The 97th Independent Brigade was formed in Chittagong, while the 53rd Brigade was moved to Dhaka as a command reserve.

Changes to Titu Mir

Brig. Gulam Jilani, chief of staff for Gen. Niazi, reviewed the existing East Pakistan defence plan in June 1971 in light of the prevailing circumstances and left the plan basically unchanged. The following assumptions were made while re-evaluating the plan:
Gen. Niazi added the following to the plan:
No war games were conducted to factor in the new directives, or specific plans drawn up to attain these objectives. The revised plan was sent to Rawalpindi and approved in August 1971. During June and July, Mukti Bahini regrouped across the border with Indian aid through Operation Jackpot and sent 2,000–5,000 guerrillas across the border.

Eastern offensive proposal

By July 1971 the Pakistan Army had built up an intelligence network to track Mukti Bahini infiltration and counter it through ambush, artillery shelling and minefields along the border with India. Gen. Niazi claimed to have suggested the following measures to Gen. Hamid during his visit in June:
The Indian military at this time was vulnerable, with its main formations posted away from the East Pakistan border. Col. Z.A. Khan also advocated aggressive action against select Indian targets. General Hamid ruled out any provocations that might provoke Indian retaliation, while outlining the main objective of the Eastern Command: to keep the insurgency under control and prevent the formation of a Bangladesh government inside the province. Gen. Niazi remained convinced that his scheme would have forced India to concede terms, but at least one Pakistani source labels his proposal "sheer folly".
The main plan remained unchanged until September 1971: Pakistani units were to fight a series of defensive battles before deploying to defend the Dhaka Bowl, but every inch of the province would not be defended. The Pakistan army occupied all the towns and fortified 90 of the 370 BoPs and deployed close to the border to halt Mukti Bahini activity.

Western Command strategy

The Pakistani high command began contemplating full-scale war with India to settle all issues as the insurgency in Bangladesh began to escalate after August; with Mukti Bahini activities more aggressive and effective, Pakistani forces were in disarray. In doing so they had to contemplate fighting in the west and the east, and the ongoing insurgency. Since the defence of East Pakistan rested on overwhelming Pakistani success in the west, any formal war would also start when Pakistani forces in West Pakistan were ready to strike. In the summer of 1970, the western operational plan was revised. The following conclusions were drawn:
It was decided to keep part of the reserves to the north of the Ravi River and part to the south. The plan called for the formations near the border to seize favourable lodgement areas, to screen the main attack of the army. In September 1971 the plan was updated to include:
The Pakistani army had thirteen infantry and two armoured divisions in West Pakistan in 1971. After transferring the 9th and 16th Divisions to East Pakistan, they had a rough parity with the Indian army in infantry and a slight edge in armour. However, they could only hope to attack with 3:1 superiority in selected areas where surprise was vital. Pakistan had raised the 33rd Infantry Division, and had started to raise the 35th and the 37th Divisions to replace those sent to Bangladesh; these formations were active but not fully operational by November 1971. The Pakistan Army deployed ten infantry and two armoured divisions to face an Indian force of three corps as follows:
Aside from these formations, Pakistan also had two independent artillery and two infantry brigade groups deployed on the border. The initial Pakistani plan was to launch diversionary attacks along the whole Indian border to keep Indian reserve forces away from the main target areas, then attack the Poonch and Chhamb sectors and drive back the Indian forces while an infantry brigade pushed into Rajasthan towards Ramgarh. Once India had committed her reserves, II Corps would assemble south of the Sutlej and move east into India, swinging northeast towards Bhatinda and Ludhiana. Then IV Corps would push towards the Indian Punjab. Given that India had a slight edge in forces, Pakistani armoured units and the Pakistan Air Force needed to gain the upper hand quickly to ensure this plan succeeded.
The overall objective of the Pakistani ground assault was to capture enough Indian territory in the west to ensure a favourable bargaining position with India, and by forcing India to commit forces in the west and triggering the withdrawal of Indian forces from the east. From October 1971 onwards, Pakistani units began to take up positions along the border.

Importance of airstrikes

To negate Indian superiority in infantry, the Pakistan Air Force needed to achieve air superiority on the western front. In 1971 it had 17 front-line squadrons facing 26 Indian front-line squadrons, while India deployed 12 squadrons in the east and had another seven squadrons deployed elsewhere. PAF planners were aware that once India neutralised the lone PAF squadron in East Pakistan, it would be free to concentrate more aircraft in the west after deploying units to negate any Chinese moves. The PAF devised Operation Chengiz Khan to launch preemptive strikes on the IAF and neutralise its advantage at the onset of the war.

Naval role

The Pakistan Navy was in no position to counter the Indian threat, despite appeals to enhance naval capabilities. The Pakistan Navy under commander-in-chief Vice Admiral Muzaffar Hasan, with one cruiser, three frigates, five destroyers, four submarines and several gunboats, faced the Indian Western Fleet consisting of one cruiser, eight frigates, one destroyer, two submarines and several patrol and missile boats in 1971. The Pakistan Navy had no aggressive plans except sending the Ghazi to the Bay of Bengal to sink the Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikrant. On the eastern front, only one destroyer was active with seven gunboats; therefore, it was impossible to conduct operations in the deep Bay of Bengal.

Problems in East Pakistan military

Pakistan Eastern Command HQ began to revise the operational plan from September onwards under the following assumptions:
Besides the above, the planners also had to factor in the status of the Pakistani forces in the province, logistical challenges presented by their deployment and the state of communications.

Manpower shortage

The East Pakistan garrison was reinforced with two infantry divisions in April 1971 to restore order and fight the insurgency. All divisional heavy equipment needed to fight a conventional war was left in the west. A comparison of the deployed units between March and November shows:
March 1971June 1971Dec 1971
Division HQ133
Ad hoc Division HQ002
Brigade HQ41111
Ad hoc Brigade HQ004
Infantry battalion163035 + 4
Artillery Regiment566 + 3
Armored Regiment111
Heavy Mortar battery255
Commando Battalion122
Engineer Battalion133
Ack Ack Regiment111
EPR/EPCAF Wings171717
W Pakistan Ranger Wings077
Mujahid Battalion005
Razakars022,00050,000
Al Badr/Al Shams0010,000

According to one estimate, the Eastern Command needed at least 250,000 personnel; it barely had 150,000 by November 1971. To fill the manpower gap, the East Pakistan Civil Armed Force and Razakars were raised after June 1971. The armed police was also reorganised and bolstered with 5,000 West Pakistani personnel. Therefore, the undermanned army was only fit for "Police action".
According to General Niazi, he had requested the following from GHQ in June 1971:
The Pakistan GHQ had to weigh every request to resupply, reequip and reinforce the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan against the need of the West Pakistani forces, and did not have enough reserves of manpower and equipment for a long conflict. The Eastern Command only deemed one of the three divisions fit for conventional warfare. Seven West Pakistan Ranger wings, five Mujahid battalions and a wing of Khyber Rifles, Tochi and Thal Scouts were sent to East Pakistan by November 1971. Five infantry battalions were sent from West Pakistan in November. Al Badr and Al Shams units contributed another 5,000 men each.

Ad hoc units

The lack of regular units also forced the Eastern Command to improvise in two ways: creating ad hoc formations to mimic regular army formations and mixing regular troops with paramilitary units. When Pakistani planners assumed India would launch its main attack in the east along the Akhaura – Brahmanbaria axis, it had no brigades available to cover this area. The 27th brigade from Mymensingh was moved to Akhaura, while two battalions from the brigade were detached to form the 93rd Brigade in Mymensingh. Similarly, the 313th Brigade was moved from Sylhet to Maulavi Bazar and a battalion from the 313th was kept at Sylhet to form the nucleus of the 202nd ad hoc Brigade. The 14th Division was given responsibility for the Eastern Sector only, and the 36th ad hoc Division was created to defend the Dhaka Bowl. Similarly, the 314th and the Rajshahi ad hoc Brigades were created and deployed in September. In mid-November, the 39th ad hoc Division was created to defend the Comilla and Noakhali districts from the 14th Division units deployed in those areas; the 14th was tasked to defend the Sylhet and Brahmanbaria areas only. The 91st ad hoc Brigade was created to defend the Ramgarh area north of Chittagong as part of the 39th Division in November. The ad hoc formations lacked the staff and equipment of regular formations.

Deception

General Niazi hoped that by creating five divisional HQs and simulating the signal traffic of numerous brigades, he would deceive the Indian Eastern Command into committing at least 15 infantry divisions and other assorted supporting forces in the east; this would mean India would have less to deploy in the west after retaining forces to use against any possible Chinese attacks from the north. While India did not deploy 15 divisions in the east, the measures deceived the Indian Eastern Command to some extent.

Subtraction by addition

All paramilitary units were not up to army standards in terms of equipment and effectiveness, and the Eastern Command began to mix them with regular units to bolster their efficiency. Pakistani battalions were given two-thirds-companies of paramilitary units, while a company from some battalions was split into platoons and deployed at the BoPs or other places. Paramilitary personnel were attached to the platoons to bring these units up to company strength. The army members were to stiffen these mixed units, but often the paramilitary members proved to be the weakest link. Thus, some of the regular army units lost cohesion and effectiveness when their regular companies were detached from them.

Logistical woes

The underdeveloped state of the Bangladeshi communication infrastructures and the river system cutting through the plains was a formidable challenge to the movement of troops and supplies. General Niazi had ordered the Pakistan army to live off the land because of logistical difficulties, and Maj. General A.O. Mittha had recommended setting up river-transport battalions, cargo and tanker flotillas and increasing the number of helicopters in the province. Instead, the C-130 planes were withdrawn from the province, diminishing the airlift capacity of the Pakistani forces further. The Mukti Bahini had sabotaged 231 bridges and 122 rail lines by November 1971, and complicated the delivery of the daily minimum 600 tons of supplies to the army units.
The Eastern Command staff kept the plan unchanged after the review; Pakistani troop deployments were not altered after the July appraisal. Pakistani units were kept at the border with the intention to withdraw them towards Dhaka after a series of defensive battles. The Eastern Command completed a final revision of the plan in October 1971, after both generals had visited the province.

Final plan: October 1971

General Niazi, General Rahim, Brig. Bakir reviewed the existing plan and updated it to factor in the manpower shortage, logistical difficulties, and the directive of the GHQ to defend every inch of East Pakistan. The initial assumptions were:
The review committee analysed four strategic concepts when formulating the revised plan:
The fortress concept was adopted; the planners decided on a single defensive deployment of troops on the border, which went against the troop deployments advocated by earlier plans. This was done to stick to the GHQ order of not surrendering any territory to the Mukti Bahini. When devising troop deployments, the planners mixed political considerations with strategic ones and envisioned a forward-leaning defence in depth:
Once the fortress defence was chosen, General Niazi and his staff designated the following cities as fortresses: Jessore, Jhenida, Bogra, Rangpur, Comilla and Bhairab Bazar, Jamalpur and Mymensingh, and Sylhet and Chittagong. There were four lines of defence:

Having chosen the defence concept and defensive lines, the Pakistan Eastern Command outlined its course of action:
The divisional commanders were authorised to make plans for limited counterattacks in Indian territory to aid in their defensive objectives.

Planned Pakistani deployments

Pakistani planners assumed that an Indian force of 8 to 12 infantry divisions, an armoured brigade and the Mukti Bahini would launch the invasion of East Pakistan during the winter. The Pakistani army had divided the country into four sectors:
Northern Sector: This area is to the north of the Padma and west of the Jamuna River, encompassing the Rajhshahi, Pabna, Bogra, Rangpur and Dinajpur districts. Pakistani planners were undecided on whether the Indian attack would come from the Siliguri Corridor south towards Bogra or on the Hili–Chilimari axis to cut the area in two. The division was deployed to counter both possibilities.
The 16th Infantry Division defended this area. It had the 29th Cavalry, two artillery regiments and a heavy mortar battery, in addition to three infantry brigades: the 23rd, the 205th and the 34th. The general plan of defence was:
Western Sector: This area contained the Khulna, Jessore, Kushtia, Faridpur, Barisal and Patuakhali districts and was defended by the 9th Division made up of two infantry brigades: the 107th, covering the border from Jibannagar to the Sunderbans to the south, and the 57th, which covered the border from Jibannagar to the Padma in the north. Two artillery regiments, a heavy mortar battery and a squadron of tanks were also part of the division. Pakistani planners assumed three likely axes of advance from the Indian army:
The 107th Brigade was tasked with guarding the Benapol axis. This brigade was reinforced with the 38th FF in November, while the Third Independent Tank Squadron was destroyed at Garibpur on 22 November. In addition, the 55th Field Artillery Regiment and the heavy mortar battery was attached to the brigade and the 12th and 21st Punjab Battalions were deployed near its operational area.
The 57th Brigade was deployed to cover the Darshana and Meherpur areas. The 49th Field Artillery regiment was attached to this brigade, and the 50th Punjab reinforced the unit in November. To defend the Hardinge Bridge, a tank squadron was placed under the Eastern Command control near Kushtia.
In September an ad hoc brigade – the 314th was created to defend the city of Khulna.
The 57th and 107th Brigades were to defend the border, then fall back to Jhenida and Jessore and prevent the Indians from crossing the Jessore–Jhenida road. The brigades also had the option to fall back across the Madhumati River and defend the area between Faridpur, Kamarkhali and Goalanda.
Dhaka Bowl: Pakistani planners anticipated a brigade size attack on the Kamalpur – Sherpur – Jamalpur axis, and another along the Haluaghat – Mymensingh axis. They deemed this area impassable because of the hilly terrain on the Indian side and the Modhupur Jungle and Brahmaputra River to the north of Dhaka. The 27th Brigade initially was posted at Mymensingh, and the 53rd was in Dhaka. However, when the 27th Brigade was sent to Brahmanbaria, the 93rd Brigade was created from units of the 27th Brigade, and the 36th ad hoc Division was created to replace the 14th Division. The order of battle of the 36th ad hoc Division was:
Eastern Sector: This sector included the Chittagong, Noakhali, Comilla and Sylhet districts. The anticipated lines of advance were:
The 97th independent Infantry Brigade was to cover the Chittagong fortress and hill tracks. The 24th FF Battalion guarded Chittagong itself. The Second SSG was at Kaptai while the 60th and 61st Ranger Wings were posted at Ramgarh and Cox's Bazar, respectively.

Distribution of artillery and armour

The Eastern Command could not attach an artillery regiment to each of the infantry brigades, so only the 23rd, 205th, 57th, 107th, and 117th brigades were given an artillery regiment each. An artillery regiment was split between the 202nd ad hoc and the 27th Brigades, while elements of three other artillery regiments were proportionately distributed among the other brigades as required. The 29th Cavalry was split into three independent squadrons among the 16th Division troops, while two other tank squadrons and two tank troops were deployed.

Last-minute changes: November 1971

As events unfolded in Bangladesh and the Pakistani Army began to face ever-increasing difficulties, some officers at GHQ began to have second thoughts about the existing operational plan to defend East Pakistan. General Abdul Hamid, COS of the Pakistani Army, approved of the existing deployment of troops close to the border but Lt. General Gul Hassan, CGS, had little faith in the plan Lt. Gen. Niazi had outlined to him in June. Gen. Hassan supposedly tried to get the plan revised several times and insisted on abandoning the concept of defending every inch of the province, wanted the Eastern Command to redeploy regular units away from the border, fight for the BoPs and strong points on a limited scale and ensure Dhaka Bowl had enough reserves instead of the gradual withdrawal of forces to Dhaka outlined in the existing plan. However, GHQ Rawalpindi approved in October 1971 only with the following adjustments:
These suggestions were incorporated in the plan without change. From September onwards Pakistani forces had begun to fortify positions with concrete bunkers, anti-tank ditches, land mines and barbed wires. Spiked bamboo was also used, and some areas were flooded to hinder enemy movements. Engineering battalions were sent to construct fortified positions, although some of the strong points and fortresses remained incomplete.

Final reinforcements and directives

In November, Gen. Niazi sent Maj. Gen Jamshed and Brig. Bakir Siddiqi to Rawalpindi to request two more divisions as reinforcements. The GHQ promised to send 8 infantry battalions and an engineer battalion; only five battalions were sent to East Pakistan because the GHQ probably could not spare anything else. The first two units were given to the 9th Division. The next three battalions were split up and sent as reinforcements to various areas, as needed. The last three battalions were to replace the 53rd Brigade as command reserves in Dhaka, but never arrived from West Pakistan. At the meeting, the Eastern Command was told to continue its "political mission", although by this time of territory had fallen into their hands. Gen Niazi claims this order was never withdrawn, and Gen. Hassan suggested that Gen. Hamid never altered the plan Gen. Niazi had submitted in October. The GHQ never commented on the deployment plan, while others claim the Eastern Command failed to readjust its deployments despite advice from GHQ.

39th ad-hoc Division

In November 1971, Rawalpindi GHQ warned the Eastern Command that the Indian army would launch the main attack from the east. Gen. Niazi and Gen. Rahim identified the axis of the main attack as:
Gen Niazi split the 14th Division and transferred the 117th Brigade to the newly created 39th ad hoc Division, which also included the 53rd and the 91st ad hoc Brigade. The deployment of the troops was:
The final plan was created to meet both political and strategic objectives, and its success depended on two crucial factors: predicting the possible Indian axis of advance correctly, and the ability of the Pakistani troops to fall back to their designated areas in the face of Indian air superiority and Mukti Bahini activity. The Pakistani Eastern Command was fighting a holding action cut off from reinforcements and without any reserves to counter unforeseen developments, and its ultimate success lay in Pakistan defeating India in the west. If any of the factors deviated from the assumed norm of the plan, the Eastern Command was without the resources to win on its own. The Pakistani army had been fighting the insurgency nonstop for eight months and was severely fatigued and short of supplies; in addition, the deployment near the border had robbed them of the manoeuvrability needed for a flexible defence.