Cofer Black
Joseph Cofer Black is a former CIA official who was appointed Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism by President George W. Bush and led the Office of Counterterrorism in the U.S. State Department until his resignation in 2004. Previously Black served in the Directorate of Operations at the Central Intelligence Agency and Director of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center.
In 1973, Black completed his BA at the University of Southern California. The next year he earned a master's degree in international relations, also at USC. Later that year he left the doctoral program to join the CIA.
CIA career up to 1999
At the CIA, Black trained for the clandestine service and volunteered for Africa due to his childhood experiences there. During his CIA career, Black served six foreign tours in field management positions.Initially, he worked as a case officer in Lusaka, Zambia during the Rhodesian Bush War. He then transferred to Somalia, where he served for two years during the conflict between Ethiopians and Somalis. He worked in South Africa during the National Party government's war against guerrilla movements opposing the apartheid system. While assigned to Kinshasa, Zaire, Black was involved in the Reagan Administration's covert action program to arm anti-communist guerrillas in neighboring Angola.
In 1993, Black transferred from London to Khartoum, Sudan, where he served as CIA Station Chief until 1995. This was at a low point in U.S.-Sudanese relations, particularly over the latter country's sponsorship of terror and the harboring of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden. Black oversaw the collection of human intelligence on terrorist cells and support structures, and toward the end of his tenure, he was targeted by Al Qaeda for assassination. Black was also responsible for the collection of intelligence that directly led to the 1994 capture of the terrorist known as Carlos the Jackal.
In 1995, Black was named the Task Force Chief in the Near East and South Asia Division. From June 1998 through June 1999, he served as the Deputy Chief of the Latin America Division.
Director, CTC, 1999-2002
In June 1999 CIA chief George Tenet named Black director of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center. In this capacity, Black served as the CIA Director's Special Assistant for Counterterrorism as well as the National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism. Black's promotion was a part of Tenet's "grand plan" for dealing with al-Qaeda. Black was the operational chief in charge of this effort. Tenet also put "Richard," one of his own assistants, in charge of the CTC's bin Laden tracking unit. Black still headed the CTC at the time of the attacks of September 11, 2001.Al-Qaeda strategy, 1999–2001
In December 1998 CIA chief Tenet "declared war" on Osama bin Laden. Early in 1999 Tenet "ordered the CTC to begin a 'baseline' review of the CIA's operational strategy against bin Laden." In the spring he "demanded 'a new, comprehensive plan of attack' against bin Laden and his allies."The CTC had produced a "comprehensive plan of attack" against bin Laden and previewed the new strategy to senior CIA management by the end of July 1999. By mid-September, it had been briefed to CIA operational level personnel, and to the NSA, the FBI, and other partners. The strategy was called simply, "the Plan."
... Black and his new bin Laden unit wanted to "project" into Afghanistan, to "penetrate" bin Laden's sanctuaries. They described their plan as military officers might. They sought to surround Afghanistan with secure covert bases for CIA operations—as many bases as they could arrange. Then they would mount operations from each of the platforms, trying to move inside Afghanistan and as close to bin Laden as they could to recruit agents and to attempt capture operations. Black wanted recruitments and he wanted to develop commando or paramilitary strike teams made up of officers and men who could "blend" into the region's Muslim populations.
Black also arranged for a CIA team, heade
It is not clear what relation this "Qaeda cell," which appeared to duplicate the function of the Bin Laden unit, had to the unit.
Parallel with these developments, in November–December 1999 Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, and Nawaf al-Hazmi visited Afghanistan, where they were selected for the "planes operation" that was to become known as 9/11. Working with a Malaysian security unit, the CIA watched al-Hazmi and his companion Khalid al-Mihdhar as they attended in January 2000 a Qaeda conference in Kuala Lumpur, later determined to be where decisions about the "planes operation" were made.
"We surveil them. We surveil the guy they're there to meet," Black recalled. "Not close enough to hear what they're saying, but we're covering, taking pictures, watching their behavior. They're acting kind of spooky. They're not using the phone in the apartment. They're going around, walking in circles, just like junior spies. Going up to phone booths, making a lot of calls. It's like, 'Who are these dudes?'"
According to an internal CIA report on the performance of the agency prior to the 9/11 attacks, Black was criticized for not passing on information to the FBI that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar had subsequently entered the United States. In addition, the 9/11 Commission found that while Black testified before Congress's Joint Inquiry into 9/11 that the FBI had access to information on the two hijackers, the 9/11 Commission found no such evidence of this.
The CIA increasingly concentrated its diminished resources on counter-terrorism, so that resources for this particular activity increased sharply. At least some of the Plan's more modest aspirations were translated into action. Intelligence collection efforts on bin Laden and al-Qaeda increased significantly from 1999. "By 9/11," said Tenet, "a map would show that these collection programs and human networks were in place in such numbers as to nearly cover Afghanistan."
During the summer of 2001, Tenet, Black, and one of Black's top assistants—"Rich B" —were active in advertising the dangers of al-Qaeda to the new Bush administration. At a meeting with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and others on July 10, "Rich" predicted a "spectacular" terrorist attack against US interests "in the coming weeks or months"... "Multiple and simultaneous attacks are possible." After the meeting, "Rich and Cofer congratulated each other," feeling that at last the CIA had gotten the full attention of the administration. At an internal CIA update in late July, "Rich" dramatically predicted, "They're coming here!".
One of the ways in which CIA/CTC surveiled Osama bin Laden in his Afghan base was with the Predator reconnaissance drone. A joint CIA-USAF program of flights in autumn 2000 produced probable sightings of the Qaeda leader. Black became a "vocal advocate" of arming the aircraft with missiles to kill bin Laden and other Qaeda leaders in targeted killings. During the new Bush administration in 2001, Black and "Richard" continued to press for Predators armed with adapted Hellfire anti-tank missiles. Legal and technical issues delayed the program. Black urged Tenet to promote the matter at the long-awaited Cabinet-level Principals Committee meeting on terrorism of September 4, 2001. The CIA chief duly did so. The CIA was authorized to "deploy the system with weapons-capable aircraft."
September 11, 2001
After the 9/11 strikes on the World Trade Center and The Pentagon, some CTC staff refused an order to evacuate the CIA headquarters building at Langley. They included the shift of the Global Response Center on the exposed sixth floor, which Black would eventually argue had "a key function in a crisis like this." Tenet finally accepted that Black wouldn't leave, and that their lives would be put at risk.The CTC obtained passenger lists from "the planes that had been turned into weapons that morning." " CTC analyst raced over to the printing plant," from which most CIA staff had been evacuated, and pointed out the names Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who they had "been looking for the last few weeks." This was the first "absolute proof" that the attacks were an Al-Qaeda plot. The CTC had first come across the names in connection with potential terrorist activity in the winter of 1999-2000 .
Post 9/11: Global War on Terror
The CIA's planning efforts had put them in a better position to respond after the attacks. As Tenet put it,How could community without a strategic plan tell the president of the United States just four days after 9/11 how to attack the Afghan sanctuary and operate against al-Qa'ida in ninety-two countries around the world?
This was at a "war council," a restricted group of the National Security Council, chaired by President Bush at Camp David on September 15, 2001. Black was also present. Tenet proposed first to send CIA teams into Afghanistan to collect intelligence and mount covert operations. The teams would act jointly with military Special Operations units. "President Bush later praised this proposal, saying it had been a turning point in his thinking."
Woodward's Bush at War mentions two meetings at which Black was present while implementing this plan with memorable "Blackisms." In a September 13 meeting with Bush Black said
Later Black used the same technique to impress the Russians.
The CIA geared up to take the lead in the attack on al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The NALT team, led by Gary Schroen, entered the country once more on September 26, 2001. A new branch was added to the CTC—CTC Special Operations, or CTC/SO. Hank Crumpton, the former head of CTC operations, was recalled to head it. Black told him, "Your mission is to find al-Qa'ida, engage it, and destroy it."
Testifying at the Congressional Joint Inquiry into the September 11 attacks in 2002, Black eschewed the offer of anonymity because "I want to look the American people in the eye."
During the "war on terror" Black is said to have played a "leading role in many of the 's more controversial programs, including the rendition and interrogation of al-Qaeda suspects and the detention of some of them in secret prisons ." But there has never been any solid factual support for these contentions. Black had resigned from government service in 2004 and entered the private sector before the controversial renditions occurred. Black's legacy is that he created and led the team that successfully counter-attacked Al-Qaeda and the Taliban immediately after 9/11, while concurrently leading the successful implementation of the presidentially approved "Worldwide Attack Matrix," in which the CIA engaged all known Al Qaeda operatives and supporters on a global basis. This full court press may have stopped Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda from implementing any follow-up attacks on the United States if any such attacks had been planned. In addition, Black can be credited with having provided clear early warnings to the president's top advisors on July 10, 2001—two months before 9/11—that a major terrorist attack was imminent, and with having urged that immediate preventive action be taken.
Post-CIA career
US Department of State (2002–2004)
Black became the US Department of State's Ambassador-at-Large for counter-terrorism in late 2002. He held this position until November 2004.As the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism , Ambassador Black's office, S/CT, had primary responsibility for developing, coordinating and implementing U.S. counter-terrorism policy. On behalf of the Secretary of State, Ambassador Black represented the Department on the Counter-terrorism Security Group. His office played a leading role on the Department of State's counter-terrorism task forces organized to coordinate responses to international terrorist incidents. responsibilities included coordinating U.S. Government efforts to improve counter-terrorism cooperation with foreign governments, including the policy and planning of the Department's Antiterrorism Training Assistance Program.
Private sector work (2005–present)
From 2005 to 2008 Black was Vice Chairman of Blackwater USA, a US-based private security firm which is "the biggest of the State Department's three private security contractors". Black resigned in 2008 reportedly after learning of illegal payments to Iraqi officials.Black is also Chairman of Total Intelligence Solutions, a private intelligence gathering group. This company was created in February 2007 by the Prince Group, the holding company that owns Blackwater. Total Intel was formed by the merger of The Black Group LLC, Terrorism Research Center, Inc., and Technical Defense.
In March 2006 Black allegedly suggested at an international conference in Amman, Jordan, that Blackwater USA was ready to move towards providing security professionals up to brigade size for humanitarian efforts and low intensity conflicts. Black denies the allegation. Critics have suggested this may be going too far in putting political decisions in the hands of privately owned corporations. The company denies this was ever said.
In January 2016 Black became an independent director of publicly traded biotechnology company Northwest Biotherapeutics.
In February 2017, Burisma Group, an oil and gas corporation based in Ukraine, announced the addition of Black to the company's board of directors.
Mitt Romney presidential campaign
On April 26, 2007, Black was chosen by Mitt Romney, a Republican candidate in the 2008 United States presidential election, to head his counter-terrorism policy advisory group.In October 2011, Black was chosen by Romney to serve as "Special Adviser" on all foreign policy issues.