Flight 6289 had been scheduled to land at Noumérat – Moufdi Zakaria Airport. The aircraft was a Boeing 737-2T4, named Monts du Daia, and was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney JT8D-17A engines. The aircraft entered service on 9 December 1983, and flew for more than 40,000 hours before the crash. The unnamed male captain, aged 48, allegedly had 10,760 hours and 10 minutes of flight experience, including 1,087 hours and 46 minutes on the Boeing 737-200 as captain. Meanwhile, Yousfi Fatima, the female first officer, aged 44, allegedly had 5,219 hours and 10 minutes of flight experience, including 1,292 hours and 42 minutes on the Boeing 737-200. Fatima was also Algeria's first female airline pilot. The first officer was the pilot flying, while the captain was the pilot not flying. Both switched roles the moment the engine failure occurred.
Timeline
At about 14:08 UTC, Air Traffic Control cleared the plane to taxi to Runway 02 and the plane left the gate. At 14:12, Air Traffic Control cleared the plane to line up and take off on Runway 02. At 14:13, the plane took off, and the first officer requested landing gear retraction. The request was immediately followed by a loud thumping noise recorded on the aircraft's Cockpit Voice Recorder, apparently caused by the rupture of the left engine. The plane veered left, and the first officer let out a chain of exclamations. At 14:15, the captain told the first officer that he was taking over control of the aircraft and insisted she let go of the controls so that he could control the plane. The first officer then handed the controls over to the captain and offered to retract the landing gear. The captain did not respond. The first officer alerted air traffic control about the situation, saying, "we have a small problem." The stick shaker then activated and de-activated twice. The Ground proximity warning system then sounded a "don't sink" alarm and was followed by the stick shaker activating a third time and continued operating until the CVR stopped recording. The GPWS then sounded a second "don't sink" alarm and the CVR stopped recording, along with the Flight Data Recorder. The aircraft was still airborne when the recordings ended. Without the landing gear being retracted, additional drag was apparently created and the plane began to lose speed at a high rate. Eventually, the plane stalled and crashed. Upon impact, fuel was spilled and ignited, causing the aircraft to burst into flames. It then skidded along the ground, striking the airport's perimeter fence, and crossing a road, before coming to a stop. Air traffic control immediately declared an emergency.
Aftermath
96 of the 97 passengers and all of the six crew members perished, a total of 102 people. The sole survivor of the accident was a 28-year-old male Algerian soldier. He was seated in the last row with his seat belt unfastened, and was ejected from the plane upon impact, escaping from the accident. The man was found in a coma with multiple injuries. However, he regained consciousness the next day. Doctors said that his injuries were not life-threatening.
Investigation
Before the accident flight, the aircraft's weight and balance and fuel load were both examined and no problems were reported. Two of the witnesses, a ground engineer who worked on the accident aircraft, and an air traffic controller who was in the tower at the time of the accident gave statements to the investigators. The ground engineer said: The air traffic controller stated: The flight instruments and flight recorders were investigated in the BEA laboratory in Paris, France. The aircraft's engines were sent to Belgium for investigation. The last FDR parameters indicated that the aircraft was above ground level and was traveling at a speed of. Investigators determined that the left engine's HP turbine had ruptured, damaging the LP turbine in the process. This caused a drop in power to the engine, though it did not shut down completely according to the flight recorders.
Crew resource management
The engine failure suddenly created a heavy workload for the flight crew. The captain took control only of the aircraft eight seconds after the engine failed. As he had done this at a critical phase, the captain could not initiate any emergency procedures. In addition, he used non-standard terminology. The first officer failed to properly perform her PNF duties, and even had her hands on the controls when the stall warning sounded, indicated by the captain saying telling her to let go of "let go" and "take your hand off". The "gear up" callout is supposed to be made by the PF, and carried out by the PNF. While still the PF, first officer made the "gear up" callout as required, but after becoming PNF, the first officer continued to ask the captain if the landing gear should be retracted and could even have performed the action herself because of the transfer of control, however the first officer did not retract the gear as captain did not respond to her request, presumably because he had a heavier workload as he was now the PF. The first officer had also failed to monitor the speed. The aircraft crashed into the ground tail-first. The flight crew's actions following the engine failure were informal, did not adhere to standard operating procedures, and did not utilize crew resource management.
Conclusion
The final report was published with the following:
